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In the US the skill premium and the non-production/production wage differential
increased strongly from the late 1970s onwards. Skill-biased technological change,
trade with unskilled-abundant countries and changes in the (domestic) supply of
skilled workers have been proposed as explanatory factors. By the method of
eliminating the impossible, skill-biased technological change is argued to be the
dominant explanation. This paper shows that the dismissal of the increased supply of
skill - which is argued to be countervailing rising skill premiums - is premature. In a
simple model, well embedded in the literature on R&D, knowledge accumulation and
(semi-)endogenous growth, it is shown that the demand curve for skilled labour might
well be upward sloping. Our key assumption is that skilled labour is employed in
non-production activities that both generate and use knowledge inputs. It is shown
that the tension between non-rivalness and appropriability of R&D output is crucial
for the sign of the slope of the skill-demand curve. A necessary condition for an
upward sloping demand curve is the ability of firms to appropriate the intertemporal
returns from non-production activities.
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Wage inequality has increased since the early eighties in the US (see Table 1). This is a
well documented but badly understood phenomenon. Three angles have been taken to
analyse inequality; a change in educational attainment, a change in the bias in
technological change and globalization or increased trade with low-wage countries. Among
the competing explanations, a change in educational attainment was the first to be
disqualified, as an increased average level of educational attainment is unlikely to explain
an increased skill premium.
2 The competition between the two remaining explanations,
biased technological change and trade, is still continuing.
Table 1 Non-production wage-bill and employment share, relative wage and
R&D intensity in the US 1973-1989.
a
1973 1977 1981 1989
Non-production wage-bill share .337 .351 .397 .414
Non-production employment share .246 .261 .285 .303
Non-production/production wage differential 1.55 1.53 1.53 1.62
Supply of high education
bc 10.8 16.6 21.5
R&D intensity manufacturing .063 .062 .077 .087
aSource: Machin and Van Reenen (1998).
bSource: OECD Employment Outlook (1993).
cShare of college educated, for 1970, 1980 and 1990.
This paper reestablishes the potential importance of changes in educational attainment as
an explanation for wage inequality. It is shown that in a simple model of endogenous
technological progress with production and non-production jobs, increased educational
attainment may raise demand for skilled workers. Hence, the demand curve for skilled
workers can be upward sloping.
2 Increased educational attainment implies a downward pressure on the relative wage of
skilled workers. If, however, quality of high schools decreased (and hence the quality of unskilled
workers decreases) this might offset the downward pressure.
[2]Our key assumption is that skilled workers perform tasks that are fundamentally
different from those of unskilled workers. We follow Reich’s (1991) distinction between
routine production workers and symbolic analysts. While unskilled routine workers
contribute directly to (current) production, skilled workers are employed as non-production
workers. The latter contribute to the continuous process of organizational change and
improvements within a firm that affects the future productivity of the firm. In this process
they build on and further expand the knowledge that is already accumulated within the
firm. They thus act as "symbolic analysts", both using and producing new knowledge. For
more on the type of work that is called unskilled, see the discussion on routine production
workers by Reich (1991), for more on the skilled workers see his description of symbolic
analysts.
3
If the supply of skilled workers rises, the direct effect is a decrease in their wage in
order to induce firms to absorb the increased supply and expand non-production jobs. This
is the conventional effect. However, if firms employ more skilled non-production workers,
the demand for knowledge inputs in non-production rises. To generate these inputs, skilled
workers themselves should be employed, so demand for skilled labour increases. This
second effect counteracts the conventional effect. Note that it is basically an induced
investment effect: the expansion of non-production jobs triggers investment in
organisational knowledge capital. If suffiently large, the investment effect may offset the
conventional effect. Investment incentives are significant if the cost of capital does not
increase too quickly in response to increased investment and if the returns to investment
can be sufficiently appropriated. Indeed we find that under these circumstances, the firm is
willing to attract skilled labour at a higher wage if educational attainment raises, that is,
the demand curve for skilled labour slopes upward.
Our model replicates the main stylized facts that guide the wage-inequality debate.
First, the majority of US industries have, despite the increases in the relative cost of
skilled workers, increased the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour (Bound and Johnson,
1992, Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994, Katz and Murphy, 1992). Table 1 shows that:
the increased wage-bill share of non-production workers is due to both an increase in the
non-production employment share as well as the non-production production wage ratio.
Second, our model replicates the finding that skill upgrading is positively correlated with
R&D intensity changes (Machin and Van Reenen, 1988). As a third stylized fact, it is
3The in person service type is ignored in the present analysis.
[3]worth stressing that within industry increases in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers
overwhelm the between industry shifts (Bound and Johnson, 1992, Berman, Bound and
Griliches, 1994, Katz and Murphy, 1992). Although intersectoral reallocations can be
included in our model, we do not want to focus on this aspect.
This paper relates to the literature that analyses the interaction between technology,
wage inequality and the endowment of skills, including Acemoglu (1998) and Galor and
Moav (1998). Acemoglu (1998) is closely related to our approach in the sense that
increases in the endowment of skills are causal in the increase in inequality. In Acemoglu,
similar to this paper, the upward slope of the long-run demand curve for skill is driven by
induced investment. The mechanism and assumptions driving the upward slope are,
however, markedly different. First, Acemoglu, who threats skilled and unskilled workers
as symmetric factors of production, ignores the different nature of production versus non-
production work, a distinction we acknowledge explictly. Second, Acemoglu assumes that
firms entering the reseach sector can choose between two distinct technological
trajectories, that either improve productivity of skilled or of unskilled workers. We do not
make an assumption about the existence of different technological trajectories but focus on
the cumulative nature of the accumulation process of knowledge and organisational capital.
Finally, we argue that decreasing returns in the knowledge accumulation process will
ultimately reverse the prediction that a skill supply shock will increase wage inequality.
Galor and Moav (1998), similarly, study the observations discussed earlier but emphasize
the endowment of ability and within (skill) group inequality.
The emphasis in this paper on the investment character of skilled work relates the
paper to the literature showing that skilled labour has a comparative advantage in
implementing technology and R&D (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987).
Finally, this paper uses building blocks from the literature on endogenous growth
like, for example, the intentional accumulation of knowledge by profit-maximising firms.
Opposite to most benchmark growth models (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991, and
Romer, 1990), however, we assume that innovation mainly takes place within firms and
that firms rely more on inhouse R&D and firm specific knowledge rather than on a pool
of knowledge that is fully public (cf. Peretto, 1999 and Smulders and Van de Klundert,
1995). That spillovers are simply not complete and instanteneous is a fact well
documented (see Jaffe, Trajtenberg, Henderson, 1993). We extend the theory of growth
based on firm-specific knowledge by broadening the concept of technological change to
organisation change (management etc).
[4]The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2.1 provides an overview of the model
which is presented in greater detail in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 spells out the different
effects that drive the skill premium. In the remainder of Section 2 the general equilibrium
impacts of a supply shock to the skill endowment are analysed. Section 3 checks the
robustness of our main results to a differentiation of non-production work in activities with
an investment character and activities more closely related to production. Section 4
concludes.
[5]2. A general equilibrium model of non-production jobs
2.1 Overview of the model
There is a continuum of firms, each supplying a unique product variant under monopolistic
competition. For notational convenience we normalize the number of firms to unity. Firms
hire two types of labour, labelled skilled (H) and and unskilled (L). The supply of both
types of labour is exogenously given.
As explained in the Introduction, we interpret skilled workers as non-production
workers to be contrasted to production workers which are suposed to be less skilled (note
that most empirical research explicitly takes this interpretation). Indeed, education and
training results in two types of skills. The more elementary skills consist of basic insights
and capabilities to undertake given activities at a certain accuracy. Beyond this type of
skills, there is more sophisticated skills and underlying knowledge to analyse existing
activities and to generate new knowledge. Those who obtained the first type of education
are called unskilled workers, those who also obtained the second type are called skilled
workers. We may think of skilled workers as marketing managers, organisation experts,
financial planners, research lab workers etc.
Firms maximize profits and consumers maximize utility. Consumers have Dixit-
Stiglitz preference over a variety of goods. We consider a closed economy without
uncertainty and perfect foresight in which all markets clear.
2.2 Technology and firm behaviour
Each firm produces according to the following production function:
(1)
Final output is denoted x, L are unskilled workers
4 whose effectiveness or productivity
depend on knowledge or (organisational) quality (h) created by skilled workers. Skilled
workers (H) gradually improve the organisation, production technology or for example the
4Note that we assume decreasing returns to unskilled labour 0<d<1. The underlying
assumption is that the firm also employs a fixed factor whose size is normalized to one.
[6]perceived quality by means of marketing. The one-dimensional variable h captures all
these different aspects. The stylized representation of the accumulation process for ideas is
as follows:
(2)
The (non-production) work of skilled workers improves the production environment for
the unskilled workers.
5 They use two types of knowledge inputs. First, skilled workers
analyse, exploit and expand the stock of accumulated firm-specific experience and
organisational knowledge capital (hi).
6 Second, skilled workers benefit from knowledge
developed in other firms, as captured by the average knowledge level ha in other firms.
This second knowledge input is beyond control of the individual firm and gives rise to the
intertemporal knowledge spillover externality that is familiar from R&D-based endogenous
growth models. However, firms internalize the intertemporal spillover effect from own
knowledge generation to their own non-production activities: they take into account that
accumulation of specific knowledge not only affects production but also provides inputs
for future research. Firms do not internalise the intertemporal spillovers to other firms
because they cannot appropriate the associated returns. We assume that there are non-
increasing returns to scale with respect to both types of knowledge taken together. That is,
we either assume constant returns to scale (a+g=1), which implies endogenous growth (cf.
Romer 1990), or diminishing returns to scale (a+g<1), which implies semi-endogenous
growth (cf. Jones 1995).
Keely and Quah (1998) argue that a review of the empirical literature on R&D,
technology and growth learns that: (1) inputs in the knowledge production function are
strongly related to knowledge ouput and (2) output of knowledge production is
inaccurately proxied by patents, as “Most knowledge accumulation does not occur from
private firms' R&D producing patentable knowledge.”
7 This latter observation motivates
our choice for the perspective on knowledge as a firm-specific asset. A final observation is
5 There are decreasing returns with respect to skilled labour inputs. This captures the
“stepping on toes effect”, indicating congestion and duplication in research (see Jones, 1995, for
an extensive discussion).
6 For an extensive discussion on the firm specific nature of knowledge see Smulders and Van
de Klundert (1995) and Peretto (1999). For an explicitly treatment of the tacitness of knowledge
see Dosi (1988).
7See page 3, second italics added.
[7]that spillovers do occur but do not happen automatically or completely. Hence, we do not
assume perfect nor automatic knowledge spillovers, as is clear from the distinction
between ha and hi in our specification.
Novel is the interpretation here that the regularities related to spillovers and
knowledge accumulation -- familiar to the R&D based endogenous growth literature -- are
extended to all non-production activities. To see the analogy between R&D and non-
production work think of a new way of organising a firm. The implementation and
development of new organisational schemes often takes years and builds on past
experience. From the organisational scheme that a specific firm works out some more
general principles can be useful for other firms, too. If this information is written down or
disseminates in some way other firms might benefit too (ha). However, a next firm
reorganising might use this information but still needs to go through the process of
convincing, motivating and adapting to specific "own" circumstances
8 (that is increasing
the firms specific knowledge stock, hi).
Demand for unskilled and skilled workers is determined by the firms' production and non-
production decisions, given that firms perceive a downward sloping demand curve for final
output.
Skilled workers’ output is not sold on the market directly.
9 By hiring skilled
workers, the firm can invest in firm-specific knowledge. The wage the firm is willing to
pay for skilled labour thus depends on the return to investment in firm-specific knowledge.
The firm invests up to the point that the marginal return to investment in firm-specific
knowledge equals the cost of capital. This no-arbitrage condition can be written as:
10
8Jovanovics (1995) argues that adjustment and implementation costs of ideas dominates the
non-rivalness of knowledge.
9Think of output of the marketing manager, the human resource manager, the product
designers and the organisational experts.
10The following three equations can be straightforwardly derived from the firms dynamic
optimization problem. Firms maximize profits, discounted by interest rate r, subject to (1), (2)
and the downward sloping demand curve for its output. Suppressing the firm index i, we may
write the Hamiltonian as p(F(h,L)) F(h,L)−wLL − wHH + qG(h,ha,H), where F() is the
production function in (1) and G() is the accumulation function in (2).
[8](3)
where is the elasticity of demand, r is the cost of capital (nominal interest rate) and q is
the shadow value of firm-specific knowledge, or in other words the firms internal
accounting price for non-production workers’ output. The left-hand side of the equation
represents the marginal return from non-production workers activities. The first term
represents the value of their contribution to improving production efficiency, the second
term represents the value of their contribution to providing knowledge inputs for the
process of investment in firm-specific knowledge, and the final term captures a capital
gain (capturing the fact that if the price to knowledge increases over time, investing today
in knowledge becomes more attractive).
The firm hires skilled labour up to the point where the marginal cost of hiring (the
wage for skilled labour, wH) equals its marginal product which is the marginal amount of
knowledge it generates (GH) valued at the price of knowledge q:
(4)
Similarly, the firm hires unskilled labour up to the point where the marginal cost of
hiring (the wage for unskilled labour, wL) equals its marginal revenue product. Taking into
account that the firms demand curve for final goods slopes downward we find:
(5)
2.3 Short-run partial equilibrium
We now reduce the conditions governing firm behaviour into one equation. We assume
that firms are symmetric. Because we normalized the number of firms to one, in
equilibrium the representative firm absorbs all labour (Li=L and Hi=H). The symmetry
[9]assumption also implies that h and ha grow at a common rate, denoted by g, which can be
written (from (1)) as:
(6)
Assuming that both H and L grow at a common rate n and evaluating the partial
derivatives, we find:
(7)
where hats denote growth rates. This equation equates the real cost of capital to the real
return to investment. We can use it to study the partial equilibrium short-run effects of an
increase in the supply of high skilled labour H by keeping the knowledge level h and the
real cost of capital r−ˆ p constant. Whenever the return to investment increases, there will
be an induced demand for skilled labour and hence an upward pressure on their relative
wage.
The first term on the lhs represents the direct effects of investment for production. If
more skilled labour is employed the first term becomes smaller.
11 The reason is that the
costs of productivity improvements, relative to production costs, rise with H because of
diminishing returns (l<1). Hence, a higher supply of skilled labour reduces their relative
wage if firms only cared about their ability to improve productivity in production (that is,
if only the first term on the lhs mattered). This is the conventional effect of an increase in
skills.
The other terms on the lhs reflect the effects of knowledge growth on the future
relative costs of (or return to) organizational change. Let us first consider the term (b−g)g.
On the one hand, the larger the impact of organizational change, as captured by g,o n
productivity of unskilled labor, as captured by b, the more attractive it is to invest. Large
increases in productivity induce firms to invest now rather than later and increases their
demand for the skilled labour to be able to undertake these investments. On the other
hand, if knowledge spillovers from other firms are large, knowledge growth results in
large reductions over time in the cost of organisational change, which reduces the
11 If more unskilled labour is employed (L higher), the return to investment is higher since
more production workers benefit from the same increase in productivity due to the non-rivalness
of knowledge. Hence, an increase in unskilled labour raises the demand for skilled labour to
undertake the investments which leads to an increase in the skill premium.
[1 0]incentive to invest now and makes firms willing to postpone investment, thus reducing the
demand for skilled labour. If the scope for productivity improvements (b) is large and
spillovers (g) are small, firms are willing to invest more in response to a higher growth
rate. Ceteris paribus, this increases demand for skilled labour. Employing more skilled
labour increases the rate of productivity growth. Hence, if spillovers are small, this may
increase the demand for skills. Thus the demand curve for skilled labour tends to slope
upward because of this channel.
The third term on the lhs, the rate of increase in the skill premium, reflects the fact
that if skilled labour becomes more expensive to hire over time, investment becomes more
expensive over time, and it is attractive to undertake investment now rather than in future.
This increases the demand for skills, ceteris paribus.
2.4 General equilibrium
In a closed economy, the cost of capital is determined by savings behaviour of households.
Assuming that representative households maximize utility over an infinite horizon subject
to their intertemporal budget constraint, we may represent savings behaviour by the
familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule:
(8)
where r is the elasticity of marginal consumption which is assumed to be constant (1/r is
the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution), J is the utility discount rate.
12 We
have employed the fact that total production of the representative firm (x) ends up as
consumption goods. This equation expresses the required rate of return on households’
savings as the sum of the discount rate and the premium for consumption smoothing
which depends on the growth of consumption (ˆ x) and the willingness to intertemporally
substitute as determined by the curvature of the utility function (r).
12We have to correct the discount rate for the growth in the size of the household, which is




−qtdt, where c is per capita consumption, N is the size of the household which
grows at rate n, and n is the preference for children (note that n=1 (n=0) correspond to a
Benthamite (Millian) intertemporal utility function, see Canton and Meijdam 1997). The relation
between population growth an the pure utility discount rate reads: J=q−(n+r−1)n.
[1 1]Combining (1), (6), (7) and (8), we find an equation in two unknown variables, viz.
the skill premium wH/wL and the growth rate g:
(9)
where JnºJ+[l+d(r−1)]n.
2.5 The upward sloping demand curve and endogenous growth
We first illustrate the main result of an upward sloping demand curve for skilled labour in
a special case of the model. We assume that there are constant returns with respect to
knowledge accumulation in the non-production activities, that is a+g=1. As a result, the
rate of growth in the economy depends on the supply of skilled labour only see (6). To
avoid accelerating growth rates, we assume that there is no population growth (n=0), the
usual assumption in endogenous growth literature.
The model is now fully represented by equation (6) and (9). Figure 1 depicts
equation (6) as the vertical line labeled GG. The SS-curve in the figure is the locus for
which the skill premium wH/wL is constant as can be derived from equation (9). Full
employment of skilled labour requires that the economy is always on the GG line. The
skill premium jumps immediately to its long-run value, given by the point of intersection
between the GG line and the SS curve.
insert Figure 1
We are now ready to analyse the general equilibrium consequences of an increase of
the supply of skilled labour for wage inequality. If H increases, the SS-locus shifts down
and the GG-line shifts to the right. Hence the change in the skill premium is cannot be
unambiguously determined from the Figure. Fortunately, we can easily find a closed form
solution for the skill premium. Substituting (6) into (9), and taking into account that
a+g=1 and that the skill premium is constant, we find:
[1 2](10)
Differentiation with respect to H reveals that the condition for a rise in the skill premium
is given by:
(11)
This last condition neatly reveals four determinants that may cause the demand curve for
skills to slope upward.
First, appropriability of the (intertemporal) returns to non-production activities (as
measured by a) should be high. The mirror image of this is that spillovers to other firms
(as measured by g) should be low. This underlines our key assumption that skilled workers
create the knowledge that is subsequently used as an essential input in non-production
activities. If new knowledge only affects the firm’s production activities and all knowledge
inputs in non-production activities come from outside (i.e. a=0), condition (12) could
never be satisfied and the demand curve for skills sloped conventionally downward. Note
that most of the endogenous growth literature consider this case by assuming that all
intertemporal spillovers from research are external effects for the individual firm.
Second, the cost of capital should not rise too fast with increased investment. Note
from (7) that r governs the sensitivity of interest rates with respect to investment. This
emphasises the assumption that non-production labour is engaged in the investment
process, rather than the production process. If firms hire more skilled labour, investment
and growth rises in the economy, forcing households to save more. This induces them to
require a higher rate of return on their savings, especially when they prefer a smooth
consumption pattern (r large). When firms face a higher cost of capital, investments in
firm-specific knowledge by hiring more skilled labour becomes less attractive. The rise in
the cost of capital thus mitigates the demand for skilled labour. For the demand curve for
skills to slope upward, the cost of capital should not increase too much which happens if
intertemporal substitution is high (1/r high).
[1 3]Third, diminishing returns with respect to knowledge in production (as measured by
1−b) reduce the skill premium. Diminishing returns reduce the value of additions to the
knowledge stock which are generated by hiring more skilled labour.
13
Fourth, diminishing returns with respect to skilled labour in non-production activities
(as measured by 1−l) reduce the skill premium. Diminishing returns reduce the marginal
value of skilled labour for the firm and thus depress their wage.
To summarize, an upward sloping demand curve for skills requires that the
intertemporal returns from an expansion of non-production activities accrue mainly to the
firm rather than to shareholders (in the form of higher rates of return) or other firms
(because of spillovers). Moreover, the returns should not fall too quickly because of
diminishing returns in production or non-production activities. Only under these
circumstances, the firm passes through the intertemporal returns to non-production workers
in the form of higher wages for skilled labour.
2.6 The upward sloping demand curve and non-scale growth
We now turn to the more general version of the model and assume that there are
diminishing, rather than constant, returns with respect to knowledge in non-production
activities, and we take into account population growth (a+g<1, n>0). The main difference
with the case in the previous section is that now long-run growth becomes independent of
the size of the skilled labour force. Hence, there is no scale-effect on the growth rate from
an increase in the supply of skills. We show that the upward sloping demand curve arises
under fairly similar conditions, but vanishes in the long run.
The growth rate depends on the supply of skilled labour and the stock of firms-
specific knowledge accumulated in the past, see equation (6). Accordingly, the growth rate
13This effect vanishes if there are no spillovers (i.e. if g=0). In this case, all knowledge is
created inside the firm with constant returns with respect to knowledge (see (2) and note that
a=1−g=1). On the firm level a constant rate of growth of knowledge can be attained equal to xH
l
which translates in a constant rate of total factor productivity growth equal to bxH
l. Hence,
diminishing returns are no longer important. In contrast, if the firm relies on outside knowledge
(g>0), it takes into account that an increase in firm-specific investment reduces its rate of
knowledge growth for a given rate of growth in the outside knowledge stock ha. This hurts the
firm the more the more important are the diminishing returns in the use of knowledge in
production (as measured by 1−b).
[1 4]is a predetermined variable that changes over time. Differentiating (6) with respect to time
yields the equation of motion for the growth rate:
(12)
Hence the GG locus for constant growth rate reads
g=ln/(1−a−g). (13)
The SS-locus is the same as in the case of endogenous growth
14 and follows directly
from (9). Figure 2 depicts the Phase diagram that results from equations (9) and (12).
Transitional dynamics occur along the upward sloping saddle path.
insert Fig 2
To analyse the consequences of an increase in the supply of skilled labour, we now
need to distinguish between long-run and short-run effects. For simplicity, we consider a
permanent increase in H on t=0, but allow H to grow at rate n at all other dates.
The long-run growth rate is not affected by the supply shock (GG-locus remains
unchanged), while the SS-curve shifts down. Hence in the long run, the skill premium
unambiguously declines in response to an increased supply of skilled labour.
An increase in skilled labour increases the demand for knowledge inputs in non-
production activities on impact. Indeed, the expansion of non-production activities results
in an increase in the stock of firm-specific knowledge in the long run (or to be more
precise, an increase in knowledge per skilled worker). But, because of diminishing returns
in non-production activities with respect to knowledge, this causes the returns to additional
knowledge inputs to fall, thus ofsetting the increase in the demand for the skilled labour
that produces these knowledge inputs. In the long run, increases in firm-specific
knowledge cannot make non-production workers more productive because of diminishing
returns. Hence, in the long-run, there is no increase in demand for skilled labour for this
purpose. In the long run knowledge only makes production more productive, and putting
in more effort in this sphere requires a fall in the skill premium (the conventional effect).
14Except for the fact that Jn takes a different value because of population growth.
[1 5]In the short run, however, the growth rate increases by the expansion of non-
production jobs. The combination of the shift of the SS locus and the short-run increase of
the growth rate produces a (short-run) result that is very similar to that in the endogenous
growth case. Indeed, the skill premium may increase in the short run.
15 The difference
with the endogenous growth case is that now the (short-run) equilibrium is determined not
by the intersection of the SS locus but by the saddle path, which is below the SS locus,
thus making an increase in the skill premium less likely. The reason is that firms
anticipate a decline in the skill premium (since in the long run the skill premium
decreases), that is, they anticipate a decline in the cost of non-production activities. This
gives firms an incentive to postpone non-production activities and to reduce the demand
for skilled labour. This partly reverses a possible increase in the skill premium.
To derive an exact condition for the upward sloping demand curve to arise, we
linearize equations (9) and (12) around the steady state and calculate the short-run
response of the skill premium to a change in the supply of skilled labour. The linearized
system reads:
(14)
where tildes refer to percentage deviations from the initial steady state (log-linearized
variables) and aºbg[r−(1−g/b)]. From (6) we find the initial change (a time t=0) in the
growth rate (which is predetermined):
(15)
where H tilde is the permanent shock to the skill endowment.
The stable root of this system is ln. Hence, we can calculate the jump in the skill
premium as:
15In the short run -- before the per capita stock of knowledge has fully adjusted -- non-
production workers become more productive if more knowledge inputs are available. This gives
firms the incentive to hire more labour to produce this knowledge.
[1 6](16)
The skill premium increases in the short run if the expresion in parenthesis is negative.
Taking into account the definition of a given above, we find the following condition:
(17)
Note that this is exactly the same condition as for the endogenous growth case, see (11),
although now of course a and g no longer sum up to unity (and J takes a different value
because of population growth). Hence, the very same mechanisms as already explained in
the previous case apply.
3. Skilled labour in production
So far we assumed that all skilled labour is allocated to non-production work with an
investment character. Though most non-production work is well captured by this
perspective, some skilled workers’ jobs are more closely related to production. You might
for example think of supervision labour and the skilled workers that implement and
monitor newly developed quality strategies. In this section we explore the robustness of
the upward sloping demand curve for the assumption that some skilled work is closely
related to production and hence does not have an investment character.
3.1 Production related skilled work
The production function for final output is now denoted as: F(hxi,Li). The effective
organisational quality, hxi, depends now on the mass of skilled workers in activities related
directly to production. Hence:
(18)
[1 7]where Hx is skilled labour allocated to production-related activities.
16 Analogously
equation (2) is now formulated as:
(19)
Hr is skilled labour in investment related activities. We assume that substitution of (18) in
(1) results in the following CES production function:
17
(20)
where firm subscripts are supressed. In the next section the model economy is analyzed in
the special case that generates endogenous growth, a+g=1.
3.2 The demand for skill and capital market equilibrium
The allocation of skilled labour in production adds another first order condition for the
solution of the firm’s optimisation problem. Firms allocate skilled workers to production-
related activities up to the point where the marginal cost of hiring (the wage of skilled
workers) equals the marginal revenue. This condition, devided by equation (5), looks like:
(21)
This condition shows more explicitly the conventional effect of changes in factor
endowments. An increase in the endowment of skilled labour is met by a decrease in the
skill premium. Ample substitution possibilities (f large) ease the absorption of skilled
workers and hence mitigates the necessary skill premium decrease. Using (21), (6) and the
resource constraint, Hr=H−Hx, the growth rate can be formulated as:
16In the previous section hi and hxi were assumed identical.
17With f equal to unity we arrive at the Cobb-Douglas production function:
[1 8](22)
Remind that we analyse the endogenous growth version of our model, hence a+g=1. The
growth rate is increasing in the skill premium. A higher relative wage for skilled workers
reduces their attractiveness for production-related activities and hence leaves more skilled
workers for growth enhancing investment activities. Combining this equation with the no-
arbitrage condition (3) yields after some manupulation an implicit equation for the relative
wage:
(24)
This is an analogous expression to equation (10) where l is set to unity for simplicity.
Note that in both the numerator and the denominator a reallocation effect is present. The
numerator shows that a higher relative wage affects the value of the production of final
output whereas the denominator shows that reallocation of skilled labour affects the value
of organisational capital.
Close inspection (or careful application of the implicit function theorem) learns that
the sign of the expression in brackets before H, that is the sign of r−(1−g/b)=
r+(1−b)g/b−a, determined the sign of the effect of an increase in H on the skill premium.
Hence, we find a similar condition as in the benchmark model (see equation (11) with
l=1).
4. Conclusion
Wage inequality increased in the 1980s in the majority of OECD countries. In the
evaluation of the potential explanations for this phenomenon, trade, technology and
relative factor supplies (education), the last explanation was immediately rejected as
[1 9]implausible. The reason for this being that the supply of skilled labour has been increasing
throughout the 20
th century.
We showed that an increased endowment of skilled labour might induce an increase
in the relative wage for skilled labour. The argument that this paper devoloped starts with
the explicit recognition that skilled labour or non-production workers perform tasks that
are similar to investment activities. That is skilled workers produce firm-specific capital.
Once it is recognised that skilled workers use knowledge while producing knowledge an
upward sloping demand curve for skill follows, provided that (1) the degree of
appropriability of investment in organisational capital is sufficiently large, (2) the
investment cost do no rise too fast and (3) diminishing returns related to knowledge
accumulation do not set in too stongly.
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Figure 2.  Non-Scale
Growth